The long-range contribution of statistics depends not so much upon getting a lot of highly trained statisticians into industry as it does in creating a statistically minded generation of physicists, chemists, engineers, and others who will in any way have a hand in developing and directing the production processes of tomorrow. -W.A.Shewhart & W.E.Deming
Introduction
Brookhaven National Laboratory's Collider-Accelerator complex is comprised of a very large number of sophisticated systems, all of which must be fully functional during the 24/7 operational periods. Although system failures are anticipated due to the complicated nature of the facility, the total failure downtime is typically higher than desired. According to operations data for the Collider-Accelerator FY 2005 facility operating period, 13% of the downtime was due to failures. The failure data for the fiscal year 2005 running period will be analyzed and presented in this report. The data analysis includes identifying specific systems and/or procedures that may be improved in order to limit the overall downtime due to failures.
Description of the Data
Throughout the 24/7 operational running period, the main control room operations coordinator generates a chronological journal of machine status. At any given time, machine status is categorized into one of the following states:
-Unscheduled Shutdown -Scheduled Shutdown -Scheduled Maintenance -Machine Setup -Machine Development -Physics Running -Failure -Experimental Setup -Accelerator Physics Beam Experiments This report, which is limited to analyzing the Failure state from the list above, will present a statistical analysis of the number of failures, duration of failures, and total system failure times for the FY 2005 facility operational period. Each operations journal failure entry includes the start time, end time, and specific accelerator and system within the accelerator that has caused the downtime.
Description of the Analysis
The recorded failure data journal provided by the Collider-Accelerator Operations group has been imported into an excel spreadsheet and failure duration times have been computed. Each failure was assigned to one of the three daily shifts according to the time that the failure began. An overall assumption by members of the department is that more failure downtime occurs during the day shift while personnel work to improve systems, but inadvertently cause failures. Analysis of the data herein will prove this notion to be correct or incorrect.
The failures were grouped and analyzed by accelerator and by system to determine if a specific accelerator or system is more prone to failure, and where to concentrate improvement efforts in order to decrease failure downtime. An important note is that the failure data journal entries include cases where multiple failures occurred during the same time period. Therefore, the total failure time calculated by adding the duration time of all failures is not equivalent to the total time that the facility state was Failure.
Discussion of the Analysis Results

Total Failures
A total of 1006 failures occurred during the FY 2005 operating period, with a total failure time of 1393.20 hours. The average time per failure was 1.38 hours, while the failure median time was 0.57 hours. Half of the failure times were less than 0.57 hours and half were greater than 0.57 hours.
The histogram of all failures shown in Appendix B (tab Histogram2) indicates that 45%, or 455 of the total 1006 failures occurred in the 0-0.5 hour range. One would therefore expect the average time to be close to the 0.5 hours. However, the histogram shows a severely skewed right distribution instead of a standard normal distribution. Since the distribution is not symmetric, the average will not be close to the median. "The median of a histogram is the value with half the area to the left and half to the right" (Friedman, et al 60) . The large skewness value of 11.69 also provides an indication that the data are skewed right and that a large difference exists between the average and the median failure times. "Skewed data often occur due to lower or upper bounds on the data" (Histogram Interpretation). Since Failure data must be non-negative, a lower bound of 0 is created, thus causing the skewed right distribution.
Using the standard deviation value in skewed data sets can not be used to accurately describe the percent of occurrences around the mean value. If the standard deviation were used in this case to determine the number of failures greater than 1 sigma from the average, the result would be 1.38 + 3.91 = 5.29 hours. If the data were normally distributed, this would indicate that 84.1% of the failures are less than 5.29 hours, and 15.9% of the failures are greater than 5.29 hours. This is clearly incorrect because according to the histogram bins, only 34 failures, or 3.4% were greater than 5 hours.
A transformation of the data was performed in attempt to create a normal distribution by taking the log10 of each failure time. As shown in Appendix C, the histogram of the logarithm data does in fact follow the normal distribution (tab HistogramLog1). This will now allow statements to be made based on the standard deviation of the log10 data. Using this data, we can state that 68.2% of failure times have occurred in the range of 0.161 hours (9.7 minutes) to 2.035 hours. The 3-bin histogram in Appendix D (tab HistogramCheck) proves that this statement is correct.
Failures by Shift
The notion that more failure downtime occurs during the day shift was found to be incorrect. The results shown in Appendix E (tab ShiftFailureSummary) reveal that of the 1393.2 total system failure hours, 495.9 began during the day shift (8am to 4pm), 402.62 began during the evening shift (4pm to 12am), and 494.68 began during the owl shift (12am to 8am).
The total system failure hours for the day shift and owl shift are nearly identical. The total system failure occurrences however, were 26% less than the day shift occurrences -392 occurrences during the day shift, 325 occurrences during the evening shift and 289 occurrences during the owl shift.
The average duration of failures beginning during the day shift was 1.27 hours, very similar to the average 1.24 hour duration of failures beginning during the evening shift. On the other hand, the owl shift average failure duration was 1.71 hours, or 35% longer than the day shift. This is not surprising since travel time is required when personnel are called during the night to resolve issues, and although some problems are diagnosed via remote login, personnel require time to focus after being awoken during the night.
Shift failures vary significantly between systems, as shown in the Appendix F table.
Total Linac failure time was 5.8 hours with 10 failures during the day shift, and 76.5 hours with 10 failures during the owl shift. This is a tremendous difference and should be further studied.
Other systems had more failures during the day shift than during the evening and owl shifts.
For example the RF system had 118.9 hours with 59 failures during the day shift, 57.5 hours with 40 failures during the evening shift, and 103.6 hours of downtime with 42 failures during the owl shift.
Failures by System
A statistics summary of all failures by system is provided in Appendix F (tab Statistics Summary), including a summary of the system failures categorized by shift. Statistics are also Charts comparing failures between systems are provided in Appendix J (tab SystemCharts1). The 84.1% and 97.7% failure charts use the logarithm calculated +1 sigma and +2 sigma values computed in Appendix K (tab Anova by System). A pie chart of system failure counts is provided in Appendix L (tab PieFailureCounts by System), and a pie chart of system failure hours is provided in Appendix M (tab PieFailureHours by System).
Failures by Accelerator
Histograms of the failures for each accelerator are provided in Appendix N (tab Histogram by Accelerator). The time interval with the greatest number of Polarized Proton failures was in the 0.5 to 1 hour range. For all other accelerators the time interval with the greatest number of failures was in the range of 0 to 0.5 hours.
Charts comparing failures between accelerators are provided in Appendix O (tab AcceleratorCharts1). The 84.1% and 97.7% failure charts use the logarithm calculated +1 sigma and +2 sigma values computed in Appendix P (tab Anova by Accelerator). A pie chart of accelerator failure counts is provided in Appendix Q (tab PieFailureCounts by Accel), and a pie chart of accelerator failure hours is provided in Appendix R (tab PieFailureHours by Accel).
RHIC (Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider) has the largest number of failures (200, or 41% of the total failures), and the largest number of total failure hours (324 hours, or 37% of total failure hours). AGS (Alternating Gradient Synchrotron) follows with 125 failures or 26% of the total failures, and 265 failure hours or 30% of the total failure hours. This is not surprising since RHIC is the largest, most complex machine in the facility and AGS is the second largest.
Linac however, has a disproportionate number of failure hours (20% of the total) with respect to its size and complexity when compared with the Booster (8% of the total), Tandem (4% of the total) and Polarized Protons (1% of the total).
F-value results
Two Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) calculations were performed -one using the system failure times (Appendix K, tab Anova by System), and another using the accelerator failure times (Appendix P, tab Anova by accelerator). The F-value for the source of variation between system failures is 10.51, while the F-value for the source of variation between accelerator failures is 0.23 (3.07 for logarithm calculation). "When an F test turns out to be significant, we know, with some specified degree of confidence that there is a real difference somewhere among our means" (Philips 138).
This indicates that significant variations in failure times exist between systems, but a fairly small variation in failure times exists between accelerators. This result can also be used to conclude that a focus on limiting system failures may provide greater overall benefit than focusing directly on limiting the failures of each accelerator. This conclusion is very understandable since most systems have common components in each of the accelerators.
Recommendations
Based on the statistical analysis performed in this report, the following actions are recommended:
1. Determine the reason for large Linac failure time during the owl shift. 24/7 on-site support for the Linac should be considered, but may require that additional personnel be trained. Cooper encourages any and all to consider lean maintenance reliability methodologies to "preserve uptime for the systems, machine tools and equipment you have and those you will acquire. It will increase your competitiveness by reducing the cost of doing business" (16).
Cooper goes on further to state that eliminating machine downtime and unscheduled maintenance requires preventive maintenance, where in today's world, the cost of downtime is 10-20 times higher than it was thirty years ago. "Too often, maintenance professionals are called upon to fix equipment only after there is a problem" (16). Downtime won't go away until you eliminate the stresses that cause it. Cooper's answer to increasing the reliability and uptime of equipment used can be derived from Six Sigma's Y=f(x) analysis. This function is "an effective way to view the whole concept of true preventative maintenance" (16). Cooper's proof of this function lies with his years at John Deere where he used Y=f(x) and five years of maintenance-log information to determine the seven root causes of most unscheduled downtime. Furthermore, he used Six Sigma's DMAIC (define the problem, measure the problem, analyze how the problem can be eliminated, implement the solution, control the solution to ensure its continuance and improvement) to determine ways to eliminate or protect against each root cause. Working as a consultant, he has helped eliminate root causes in many facilities, resulting in a 70-92% reduction of unscheduled downtime.
We recommend that the Collider-Accelerator explore options for the use of Six Sigma, and further study Howard Cooper's success with statistics to reduce downtime. This is a proven success story that should not go ignored. Application of these techniques at the Collider-Accelerator has real potential for reducing downtime due to failures.
We also recommend that scheduled preventative maintenance be performed efficiently and effectively. One article, Simple Checks help Prevent Complex Problems, emphasizes that "maintenance protects your investment, and helps keep the project on schedule and helps ensure the safety of the operator and other workers." This article also makes a great pointthat proper maintenance is critical to ensure machine performance and longer life. "All too often, operators presume that a machine that was working at the end of the previous day is ready to go the following morning. That, unfortunately, is not always true. In order to detect potential problems, daily walk around inspections are highly recommended." It is very important to continually look for fluid leaks, and signs of wear, damage, and loose or missing parts, not just during the one or two times a year that scheduled maintenance occurs -but daily.
Another recommendation is to report machine performance and downtime statistics with online analytical processing (OLAP) technology. According to Wikipedia, OLAP is "an approach to quickly provide the answer to analytical queries that are dimensional in nature." "Databases configured for OLAP employ a multidimensional data model, allowing for complex analytical and ad-hoc queries with a rapid execution of time" Lastly, there has been success with advanced compressor, combustor, and turbine technology, which have been reducing maintenance costs and downtime while at the same time shortening installation time of equipment. Engineers at ABB, located in Richmond, Virginia, were able to "equip the gas turbines with a single top-mounted silo combustor that allows maintenance personnel to physically enter the combustion chamber for inspection, reducing maintenance downtime" (Valenti). This allows for a reduction in maintenance of compressor blades thus saving them from corrosion problems. Benefits to the Collider-Accelerator through the use of these technological advances may include reduced downtime, increased efficiency, and monetary savings.
Conclusion
Performing a statistical analysis on data as performed and presented in this report is only one part of the process. The more difficult task is determining how to intelligently use the data to determine general and system specific process, procedural, and/or design changes that may be implemented to decrease the total downtime due to failure. "One of the things that makes decision making such a difficult task is that a manager usually does not know what the 13 future holds" (Kroeber and LaForge 8). The Collider-Accelerator at BNL is a very complex facility. Very often a series of seemingly unrelated failures result in large downtime periods.
Sometimes, after focusing efforts on one specific issue and resolving a problem, a totally new problem develops.
A detailed analysis of FY 2005 Collider-Accelerator failures and recommendations for decreasing downtime was presented herein. However, analysis of earlier and later operational fiscal years is also important to determine overall failure trends and the affect of changes that are implemented. Analysis followed by enhancements is an ongoing process that will continue for as long as the facility operates. 0 -0.5 0.5 -1 1 -1.5 1.5 -2 2 -2.5 2.5 -3 3 -3.5 3.5 -4 4 -4.5 4.5 -5 5 -5.5 5.5 -6 6 -6.5 6.5 -7 7 -7.5 7.5 -8 8 -8.5 8.5 -9 9 -9.5 9.5 -10 >10 When the log10 is taken of each value, the histogram results in a standard normal distribution. Probabilities and confidence levels may be calculated using the log data, then converting back to hours.
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